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Abstract
Can crowdfunding contribute to the rebalancing of the fi-
nancial system via democratising investment? This paper 
begins to respond to this question by establishing how and 
why investors place trust in these markets. We offer two 
contributions. First, to theoretical debates on democratic 
finance; and second, to a more empirical body of cross-
disciplinary research into popular investment via a qualita-
tive analysis of 52 original interviews with investors in six 
UK crowdfunding markets. Our data is taken from a project 
with the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority to enhance inves-
tor protection in these markets. Deploying concepts from 
across economic sociology, we find that investors: mobilise 
embedded networks to establish trust in crowdfunding; are 
motivated by expectations of ‘blended returns’; prefer auto-
mated investment tools if they lack experience; and typically 
invest with funds they have earmarked as being prepared 
to lose. We conclude that enhanced investor protection is 
required for crowdfunding to help democratise finance.
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Trust. 
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Resumen
¿Puede el crowdfunding contribuir al reequilibrio del siste-
ma financiero mediante la democratización de la inversión? 
Este documento comienza a responder a esta pregunta es-
tableciendo cómo y por qué los inversores confían en estos 
mercados. Ofrecemos dos contribuciones. Primero, a los 
debates teóricos sobre finanzas democráticas; y segundo, 
a un cuerpo más empírico de investigación interdisciplinar 
sobre inversión popular a través de un análisis cualitativo de 
52 entrevistas originales con inversores en seis mercados 
de crowdfunding del Reino Unido. Nuestros datos se toman 
de un proyecto con la Autoridad de Conducta Financiera del 
Reino Unido para mejorar la protección de los inversores en 
estos mercados. Utilizando un enfoque de sociología econó-
mica, encontramos que los inversores: movilizan redes inte-
gradas para establecer confianza en el crowdfunding; están 
motivados por las expectativas de «rendimientos combina-
dos»; prefieren herramientas de inversión automatizadas si 
carecen de experiencia; y típicamente invierten con fondos 
que han destinado a perder. Concluimos que se requiere 
una mayor protección de los inversores para la financiación 
colectiva para ayudar a democratizar las finanzas.
Palabras Clave
Crowdfunding; Democracia; Finanzas; Comportamiento 
de los inversores; Confianza.
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1. Introduction
Over four decades of neoliberalism, separate and 
complex processes of financialization have produced 
a broad socio-economic and cultural shift from post-
war Keynesianism to free-market fundamentalism in 
advanced capitalist systems (Davis and Walsh 2017). 
This has facilitated and accelerated the accumulation 
and concentration of financial power and vast profits 
in the hands of a small, super-wealthy group of neo-
liberal power elite (W.Davies 2016). As Sylvia Walby 
(2015:35) argues in relation to the events of 2008 
and since:
“Finance caused the crisis. More precisely, the fail-
ure of the state to regulate finance caused the cri-
sis. Finance is intrinsically unstable; but this can be 
mitigated. The reduction in democratic control over 
finance led to the financial crisis”.
With the urgent need to tackle the global Climate 
Emergency (Klein 2019; Pettifor 2019; Urry 2011), 
to overcome the democratic deficit (Crouch 2004), 
and to correct ever-widening inequalities (Blakeley 
2019; Dorling 2018), the case for radical democratic 
reform of the global financial system becomes in-
creasingly pressing. What shape should such radi-
cal reform take?
As the leading advocate for ‘democratic finance’, 
Fred Block (2014:4) argues “there is an urgent 
need for ideas about how finance could be reor-
ganized to disempower the existing financial elite”, 
whom he sees as a direct threat to the viability of 
democracy itself. Block (2014:7) suggests the glob-
al financial system is deliberately constructed to 
ensure the majority of private savings and invest-
ments that pass through mainstream financial insti-
tutions (i.e. high-street banks, pension funds, etc.) 
are directed into a very narrow range of channels. 
These channels are controlled by a financial elite 
who extract significant transaction fees. Attempts 
to democratise finance need “to shrink the major 
financial institutions” and “to create new financial 
channels so that private savings could be directed 
to overcome the shortage of financing”. These new 
channels must move money in a way that prioritises 
people and planet, targeting those areas of ‘system-
atic underinvestment’ by mainstream lenders, such 
as clean and renewable energy, retrofitting build-
ing stock, and large public infrastructure projects 
(Block 2014:10-11). If successful in creating the re-
quired regulatory space, gathering political support, 
and persuading the public to move their money out 
of traditional institutions, Block (2014:11) states, 
democratising finance could:
“enhance the power of local communities, put 
greater emphasis on equality and social inclu-
sion, and prioritize significant movement toward 
environmental sustainability. In short, democratiz-
ing finance fits the framework of a real utopia be-
cause it could simultaneously weaken the power 
of entrenched elites while moving society toward 
an economy that is subordinated to democratic 
political initiatives”.
At a time when finance continues to be seen as an 
external and malevolent force that simply happens 
to people, rather than a system that people help to 
create and to sustain through their habitual uses of 
money, the pursuit of a more democratic finance 
shines a new light on those disruptive innovations al-
ready motivating people to use alternative channels 
of investment. Whereas Block advocates for a much 
larger sector of non-profit retail financial intermedi-
aries as the base (i.e. mutual banks, cooperatives 
and credit unions), this paper contributes to these 
debates by asking: can crowdfunding contribute to 
democratising finance? 
Noting that wealth disparity is in part caused by a 
lack of inclusive access to investment opportunities, 
Palladino (2019) has also looked to ‘Fintech’ inno-
vations (e.g. crowdfunding) as attempting to create 
markets that enable ordinary investors to move their 
money in support of local social and medium enter-
prises (SMEs). As she states, “[t]hese new technol-
ogies open up the potential for a radically different 
approach to financial participation by lowering the 
costs of transactions and transmission of informa-
tion” (Palladino 2019:575). 
How realistic is it that crowdfunding can contrib-
ute to a democratic rebalancing of the financial sys-
tem? And, if crowdfunding can create new financial 
channels to (re)direct private savings to social and 
environmental areas short of financing, how will 
people trust them at a time of acute economic un-
certainty? This paper seeks answers by speaking 
with those who have already built and negotiated 
trust in crowdfunding. We do so via a qualitative 
analysis of 52 interviews conducted with ‘sophisti-
cated investors’ in six UK crowdfunding markets us-
ing data taken from our 2017 project with the Finan-
cial Conduct Authority (FCA)1.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the UK crowdfunding sector in order to 
establish context for an international readership, 
before briefly outlining four concepts drawn from 
across economic sociology that we used to frame 
our analysis of the data. Section 3 provides a meth-
odological description of our study in consultation 
with the FCA. We present our qualitative analysis 
in Section 4, where we find that investors: mobil-
ise embedded networks to establish trust in crowd-
funding; are motivated by expectations of ‘blended 
returns’; prefer automated investment tools if they 
lack experience; and typically invest with funds 
they have earmarked as being prepared to lose. 
We conclude by highlighting the potential of crowd-
funding for democratizing finance, but caution that 
enhanced investor protection is required if the pub-
lic are to build trust in the sector.
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2. The UK Crowdfunding Sector
2.1. What is Crowdfunding?
Crowdfunding is ‘a way of financing projects, busi-
nesses and loans through small contributions from a 
large number of sources, rather than large amounts 
from a few’ (Baeck et al. 2012:3). In practice, indi-
viduals deposit money via an online crowdfunding 
platform, committing that money to a specific proj-
ect, business or loan, and have that relationship me-
diated by the platform. Its popular association with 
donation-based contributions to charity appeals, 
creative arts projects, or local independent business 
ventures has created an image of crowdfunding as 
dominated by a ‘hipster millennial crowd’ of aspiring 
social entrepreneurs. It is an image that is hard to 
shake off (Reiser and Dean 2017). Operating akin to 
an economy of gift exchange (Mauss [1954] 2001), 
typically the promoter is a friend, a relative, or socially 
connected in some way, either physically or virtually 
(e.g. through social media) (Borst et al. 2018). For 
many, crowdfunding remains simply another form of 
charitable giving.
Contrary to this image, crowdfunding is also a seri-
ous form of investment that helps to bypass traditional 
bank lending criteria and enables more direct funding 
from highly-dispersed ‘lenders/investors’ to highly-
differentiated categories of ‘borrowers/projects’ via 
an online platform or smartphone app. These new fi-
nancial channels involve the use of various debt and 
equity business models and often raise hundreds of 
thousands (sometimes millions) in investment (An-
gerer et al. 2017; Belleflamme et al. 2014; Mollick 
2014; Lehner 2013). The types of investment facilitat-
ed through crowdfunding vary, from equity (shares) 
in a business through to peer-to-peer (P2P) loans for 
consumer goods (Langley 2016; Ahlers et al. 2015; 
Cholakova and Clarysse 2015). Sums are often allo-
cated more transparently to social and environmental 
projects systematically underfunded by mainstream 
lenders. This reflects a growing motivation amongst 
investors to pursue a ‘blended return’ of financial and 
non-financial outcomes.
2.2. Typology of UK Crowdfunding Platforms
To give a sense of scale, the total value of the 
overall alternative finance market in the UK grew 
35% to £6.2bn during 2017, up from £4.6bn in 
2016 and from £3.2bn in 2015 (CCAF 2018). This 
growth and maturation of the sector is driven by 
sophisticated P2P crowdfunding models, which 
facilitate loans either to retail borrowers (i.e. peer-
to-consumer, or P2C) or to businesses (i.e. P2B). 
As such, a highly diverse ecosystem of crowd-
funding platforms now operates in the UK (Davis 
and Braunholtz-Speight 2016; Langley 2016) and 
worldwide (CCAF 2020). Together, they provide 
capital to virtually every sector of the economy 
and life stage of a company or project, from clean 
and renewable energy through to community and 
social enterprises. UK platforms tend to develop a 
focus on a specific type of finance (e.g. donation, 
debt or equity), but then diversify via their focus 
on a specific sector of the economy, such as char-
ity, real estate, or infrastructure funding. Broadly 




These platforms facilitate the financing of indi-
viduals, charities or other smaller non-profit organ-
isations. Investors see themselves as ‘donors’ and 
participate principally because they believe in a spe-
cific cause. They do not receive a financial return on 
their money, but may receive non-financial rewards. 
Donation-based platforms facilitate investment in ev-
erything from creative arts projects through to civic 
crowdfunding ventures tied to public infrastructure. 
Leading UK donation platforms are: Crowdfunder2, 
who specialise in enabling individuals to back so-
cially-useful projects and activities; and SpaceHive3, 
who enable investment in ‘place-based’ opportuni-
ties, such as improving derelict land or bringing a 
community asset back into use.
2.2.2. Debt Security or Loans-Based Crowd-
funding Platforms
These platforms facilitate the provision of debt 
finance to organisations and companies, bypass-
ing the need for traditional banks. Depending on 
the specific model of the platform, investors lend 
money via a loan or a debt security (i.e. bond / 
debenture). Investors see themselves as ‘lenders’, 
receiving interest on money lent. If smooth, their 
capital is returned as either a single payment or as 
an annuity over the life of the investment. Platforms 
that deal in loans or debt securities are currently 
regulated under two related but separate regimes. 
Debt securities sit within the EU-derived Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)4 regime, 
whereas loans are governed by UK specific legis-
lation introduced in 2014 and updated in 20195. 
It is generally understood that debt security plat-
forms face higher regulatory standards. The debt 
category of crowdfunding is the most populated 
and diverse, which reflects the wide variety of use 
cases for debt financing within the economy. Lead-
ing UK platforms are: Abundance Investment6, a 
debt security platform focused on providing short- 
and long-term debt to infrastructure companies 
and public sector organisations; and Funding Cir-
cle7, which is a loan-based platform focussed on 
providing working capital and growth capital to the 
UK’s SME sector.
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2.2.3. Equity-Based Crowdfunding Platforms
These platforms support equity-based capital rais-
ing by new or established businesses. Investors self-
identify as such and allocate capital to a given oppor-
tunity in exchange for transferable shares. Currently, 
the sector is focussed primarily upon the ‘early-stage’ 
or ‘start-up’ phase of company growth, so investors 
typically hope their shares will increase in value. 
Crowdcube8 are a leading UK equity crowdfunding 
platform for entrepreneurs of start-ups and grow-
ing businesses to connect with potential investors. 
Seedrs9 was the UK’s first regulated equity-based 
crowdfunding platform, enabling investors to buy 
shares in early-stage high-growth businesses.
2.2.4. Co-operatives and Societies for the 
Benefit of Communities
A smaller UK market exists for both cooperative 
(Co-ops) and community benefit society (Ben Comm) 
business models. Although there are differences be-
tween the two, in practice they are extremely simi-
lar. Technically, a co-operative is run for the benefit 
of its members, whereas a benefit society is run for 
the benefit of the community. Both use withdrawable 
shares, known as ‘community shares’. This model is 
distinct from traditional equity investing as the share 
offers are currently exempt from FCA rules. The mod-
el is underpinned by the idea of equality in terms of 
governance, with one shareholder getting one vote 
regardless of investment level, rather than a vote-
per-share as with traditional equity models. Ethex10 
are the UK’s leading platform in this sector, having 
pioneered the concept of ‘positive investing’.
As this outline suggests, there is no single ‘type’ 
of crowdfunding investor. Rather, the diversity of 
platforms in the UK sector reflects the broad blend 
of motivations that individuals have for their money – 
ranging from the philanthropic to the self-interested, 
from the constructive to the speculative – and which 
investments they are prepared to trust.
2.3. Towards an Economic Sociology of 
Crowdfunding
One explanation for the growth in crowdfunding 
activity is precisely the wider ‘crisis of trust’ in main-
stream finance pointed to earlier, and which remains 
largely unchanged over a decade on from the events 
of 2008 (Tooze 2018; Mirowski 2013). The perceived 
lack of accountability and democratic control over fi-
nance has seen crowdfunding platforms increasingly 
position themselves as ‘alternative, disruptive, or de-
mocratizing’, as compared to more traditional finance, 
a positioning that has been repeatedly questioned 
(Tooker and Clarke 2018:60; Nelms et al. 2018:12; 
Langley and Leyshon 2017; Maurer 2008; Aitken 
2006). And yet, many people around the world evi-
dently do trust crowdfunding and are motivated to in-
vest, so the questions we asked were: how and why?
In seeking answers, we first note that Bandelj 
(2015:237) has stated that “little economic sociol-
ogy explicitly examines the dynamics of how trust in 
economic relations is built and negotiated […] There-
fore, crucial work remains to be done on how trust is 
achieved, mistrust is overcome, or what the conse-
quences are of trust violations, or betrayal, in eco-
nomic transactions”. Our contribution to this ‘crucial 
work’ is to analyse empirically ‘how trust is achieved’ 
and ‘mistrust is overcome’ in a single bounded sec-
tor, namely UK crowdfunding markets. 
Existing literature notes that crowdfunding inves-
tors are motivated by: a commitment to communi-
ties of interest; the exciting challenge of an innova-
tive venture; the opportunity to advance social status 
amongst peers; and, most obviously, a desire to 
make money (Lehner et al. 2015; Belleflamme et al. 
2014; Seltzer and Mahmoudi 2012; Brabham 2010). 
Clauss et al. (2018) agree that individuals will sup-
port a given crowdfunding project according to their 
social status and preferences, but add that previous 
investment experience is also a significant factor in 
shaping behaviour. In non-equity crowdfunding, Ce-
cere et al. (2017) note the importance of altruism and 
the ‘warm glow’ effect of supporting social and cul-
tural projects, whilst in equity-based crowdfunding, 
‘being excited about a specific company or project’ 
has been ranked by investors as more important than 
high financial returns (OXERA 2015:4). This blend of 
motivations is also strongly attested to by a growing 
literature on crowdfunding for social or environmen-
tal causes (Lehner and Nicholls 2014; Horisch 2015; 
Holstenkamp and Kahla 2016).
Given this, we decided against adopting a single 
theoretical framework for approaching our study. In-
stead, we read across economic sociology and ap-
plied three key concepts when interpreting our data: 
embeddedness, expectations, and earmarking. Fol-
lowing Clauss et al. (2018), we added experience as 
a fourth concept that proved to be significant in our 
analysis. 
As the economy is not separate from society and 
its institutions, Granovetter (1985) argues that the 
specific social relations in which particular economic 
actions are embedded are crucial for producing and 
sustaining trust. It is this embeddedness that enables 
economic transactions to take place (Krippner et al. 
2004; Polanyi 1957). We use this concept to frame 
our analysis of how and why crowdfunding investors 
trust the platforms they invest through, and the busi-
nesses or individuals they invest in. 
The concept of expectations points to the ‘temporal 
order’ of capitalism and the specific time horizons that 
shape economic activities (Beckert 2015; Bourdieu 
1979). For example, attitudes to risk and reward are 
framed by shorter- and longer-term expectations that 
encourage more or less ‘speculative’ attitudes towards 
finance and investment (Adkins 2018; Konings 2018; 
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Staheli 2013). We apply this concept to our analysis 
of how crowdfunding investors are motivated by the 
promise of mixed returns beyond a headline rate.
As is widely known in economic sociology, Zeliz-
er’s (1994) concept of earmarking reveals how mon-
ey is interpreted socially and culturally, such that our 
engagement with money and markets is ‘relational’ 
rather than rational. For example, the extent to which 
we interpret any money we may receive as a “gift, 
payment, or entitlement” is crucial in terms of how 
we then choose to allocate it. This was a vital insight 
when approaching our data as it allowed us to under-
stand the decisions investors take about which ‘pot’ 
of money, and which percentages of their overall port-
folio, they are prepared to earmark for crowdfunding.
As will become clear, we also deploy the theoreti-
cally underdeveloped concept of experience to cap-
ture other areas of our data. In so doing, we hope to 
encourage others to undertake the ‘crucial work’ on 
trust called for by Bandelj. Each of these four con-
cepts is used to frame the analysis of our data in Sec-
tion 4. Before then, we offer a description of our study 
and our justification of method.
3. Method
As the UK regulator, in the summer of 2016 the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) circulated an on-
line questionnaire that was completed by over 22 000 
self-certifying ‘sophisticated investors’ in UK crowd-
funding markets. Response data from this survey 
was compiled by the FCA into a single spreadsheet 
for initial analysis by researchers at the Cambridge 
Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF)11. In early 
2017, we were subsequently granted unique access 
in order to conduct an independent review of this 
data and to highlight any limitations. We concluded 
that the online survey had missed certain areas: 
what had motivated investors to move their money 
into crowdfunding; how trust in crowdfunding markets 
and platforms was negotiated and achieved; and how 
they had experienced crowdfunding investments. 
We proposed that a small-N qualitative approach 
would allow us to correct these gaps by investigating in 
depth how and why investors had decided to trust these 
markets. Framed in terms of democratizing finance, we 
also wanted to understand how their experiences might 
shed new light on how members of the wider public 
might be sufficiently protected. In so doing, might more 
people be encouraged to move their money via crowd-
funding platforms to begin to correct systematic under-
investment in vital green and social projects?
In order to access data on trust and motivations, a 
qualitative study was necessary (Byrne 2012; Mason 
2002). The authors decided to adopt a semi-struc-
tured approach, developing an interview schedule of 
35 open-ended questions that allowed us to explore 
‘investor motivations’, ‘investor behaviour’ and ‘trust 
and confidence’. This schedule was developed and 
then shared with the FCA on the understanding that 
our qualitative analysis of this interview data would 
correct knowledge gaps in their online survey. Ul-
timately, the aim was to help to form a part of the 
evidence-base for their post-implementation review 
of UK crowdfunding regulations (FCA 2019). 
Following this consultation with the FCA, we decid-
ed to focus our interviews on four investor practices: 
carrying out due diligence on crowdfunding platforms, 
entrepreneurs and investment products; understand-
ing the ‘wind down’ process in the event of any future 
platform failure; knowledge and use of platform ‘con-
tingency funds’; and understanding and use of ‘au-
tomated investment’ tools provided by platforms. We 
also added three new closing questions, inviting inter-
viewees to provide a score on a simple Likert scale 
(from 0 to 5) to signal how far they trusted five differ-
ent types of financial organisation to act in the inves-
tor’s interest. These organisations were: high-street 
banks; mutuals and building societies; small and me-
dium sized enterprises (SMEs); large multinational 
corporations; and crowdfunding platforms.
In the next stage of the research process, we emailed 
over 500 respondents to the FCA’s online survey to in-
vite them to participate in our follow-up study. Response 
rates were low (c.10%). The sample of investors from 
which our data is drawn is therefore ‘self-selecting’ and 
we were unable to control for diversity (Emmel 2013), 
beyond trying to maximise a spread across the six 
crowdfunding markets we describe below. 
As we anticipated, the majority of our sample is 
male, white, over-55 years of age, and retired. Our 
sample does include minor diversity with respect to 
age (one, 18-24; five, 35-44; nine, 45-55; and thirty-
seven, over-55), and four female investors, but iso-
lating age and gender variables revealed little during 
our analysis. For example, prior experience of invest-
ing was a far more significant factor in understand-
ing behaviour, as previously indicated, and this cut 
across both age and gender. We do, however, en-
dorse Walby’s (2015) proposal that further research 
is needed into the ‘gendered regime’ in finance.
Between 23 January and 10 February 2017, 
the authors conducted 52 interviews with investors 
across six UK crowdfunding markets: 20 with P2B 
investors; 14 with P2C lenders; 6 with equity-based 
crowdfunders; 5 with securities investors; 5 with real 
estate lenders; and 2 with real estate equity investors. 
These six market categories were established in the 
FCA’s online survey, so we retained these categories 
to improve consistency. As is clear, our sample was 
skewed towards P2B and P2C markets. We granted 
full anonymity to each interviewee as a condition of 
their participation. As such, respondents are identified 
throughout this article only by broad reference to these 
six market categories.
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In testing these assumptions, analysis of our data 
reveals that prior experience of investing is a signifi-
cant factor in deciding which crowdfunding markets 
to trust. Although most investors we studied recom-
mended that more consistent and standardised infor-
mation ought to be provided by all platforms, this view 
was concentrated amongst P2B investors who had 
experienced previous defaults by borrowers. Reflect-
ing on how they had achieved trust in crowdfunding, 
investors openly named platforms that gave limited 
information about what exactly they were investing 
in, desiring far more information about a given prop-
erty (Real Estate), a small-medium enterprise (P2B), 
or a consumer loan (P2C) before allocating funds. 
More experienced investors were wary of trusting 
platforms that provided limited information:
“… one of the main things that regulation ought to do 
is to improve consistency and comparability across 
loans and across platforms […] I mean you have to 
understand what assumptions the platforms are mak-
ing and I don’t think most people have got the time 
to do that […] So for the sector to avoid getting a 
bad name there really ought to be some standard ap-
proaches to sharing information on default rates, on 
interest rates, on loan-to-value, on a whole range of 
… standard metrics” (Real Estate investor).
More inexperienced P2C lenders, however, re-
ported feeling intimidated by large amounts of com-
plex financial information. Instead, they preferred 
to trust those crowdfunding platforms that provided 
more summative information about a prospective 
borrower. Contrary to the rational calculation of that 
“anthropological monster” (Bourdieu 2005:209), 
homo economicus, these P2C lenders were opting 
to trust platforms that were providing less informa-
tion, which they found simple and easy to grasp. 
Interestingly, we also heard that crowdfunding in-
vestments made in haste, and thus based on lim-
ited due diligence and ‘knowing less’ in a market 
context (Dorn 2012), appeared to deliver similar re-
turns to those capital allocations made with slower, 
more careful decision-making. 
Instead of relying solely upon information pro-
vided by the platforms, many investors leveraged 
networks in which they were already embedded (so-
cial capital) and drew upon wider norms and values 
(cultural capital) in their assessment of crowdfund-
ing (Bourdieu 1986). Examples included attending 
company or sector-level events, such as platform 
or product launch nights, as well as academic and 
civil society conferences. More experienced inves-
tors also spoke of proactively arranging face-to-face 
meetings with those leading crowdfunding platforms, 
either individually or as part of a wider group. As one 
P2B investor explained:
“… and they were like real people. When I spoke to 
[crowdfunding entrepreneur], he sort of told me what 
they were trying to do […] So, we were at a meeting 
in London and we sort of told him what we thought 
Each interview lasted around 60 minutes, was 
mainly conducted via Skype (occasionally via a land-
line), with data captured by the CallNote software 
package. Our audio files were sent to the TRINT tran-
scription service and subsequently shared amongst 
each author for independent coding (Fielding 2008). 
A social science colleague at the University of Leeds 
with no involvement in our study was employed as an 
independent fourth coder to enhance the reliability of 
the data by limiting author bias. For analytical integ-
rity, the authors conducted this coding process inde-
pendent of the FCA and our analysis was completed 
before sharing our indicative findings. We submitted 
a formal report to the FCA in May 2017 that informed 
subsequent rule changes to place new marketing re-
strictions on P2P platforms, designed to protect new 
or less-experienced investors, and providing exemp-
tion for direct offers to the kinds of ‘sophisticated in-
vestors’ involved in our interviews (FCA 2019).
In close, we concede that our analysis of the data 
which follows is based on a relatively small and self-
selecting sample of UK investors. Nevertheless, we 
suggest that the following analysis – framed by those 
four concepts outlined in the previous section – con-
tributes to the ‘crucial work’ necessary for economic 
sociology to understand better the dynamics of how 
trust in economic relations is built and negotiated.
4. Analysis
4.1. Embeddedness: Building and Negotiating 
Trust
Crowdfunding platforms expect investors to con-
duct their own due diligence under the broadly ac-
cepted principle of ‘buyer beware’. Existing research 
suggests that this process involves weighing up the 
balance of risk and return in a process of ‘rational’ 
calculation. Lehner et al. (2015:172) suggest that this 
isn’t easy, however, because crowdfunding actually 
provides “little opportunity for due diligence”, pointing 
to its popular image of relying upon friends and family 
for funding (Borst et al. 2018; Agrawal et al. 2015). 
Likewise, it has been suggested that “platforms 
see little incentive or advantage in providing struc-
tured, transparent access to their project data” 
(R.Davies 2015:349) and want to retain ‘information 
asymmetries’ between the platform and its inves-
tors to limit opportunities for product and marketing 
imitation by competitors (Clauss et al. 2018; Hall 
and Lerner 2010). In contrast, Langley (2016:309) 
observes that UK crowdfunding platforms are actu-
ally transparent about their historic and projected 
rates of default. Ahlers et al. (2015) suggest that 
investors in crowdfunding markets simply do not 
have the time, resources or willingness to analyse 
each entrepreneurial venture and its business mod-
el in close detail. 
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as a group. Different people told them exactly what 
we thought – him and say four or five others. And 
they sat in a room at the back and listened to what 
we were saying. And he said that’s how the platform 
was built up as well, by listening to what people said. 
And so that was quite good […] Well, it gave me con-
fidence because I knew that they’d already worked 
for [Platform A], and also I liked the software idea that 
they had. And it just seemed they knew what they 
were talking about” (P2B Investor).
We thus agree with Clauss et al. (2018) that the 
most reliable predictor of financial success in crowd-
funding is the ‘human capital’ and ‘embeddedness’ 
(Granovetter 1985) of the entrepreneurs leading the 
platforms, once again underlining the ‘relational’ 
aspect of economic behaviour (Zelizer 1994). For 
many investors, achieving trust required the devel-
opment of ‘offline’ social relations and exposure to 
those forms of ‘entrepreneurial storytelling’ outlined 
in the quote above (Manning and Bejarano 2017; 
Bernadino and Freitas Santos 2016). As with tradi-
tional financial organisations, ‘putting a face’ to an 
investment remains important, especially for experi-
enced investors: “I just want to check that the people 
are real and the business actually exists” (Securities 
Investor). Being able to verify online information in 
this way also extended to the underlying asset at-
tached to an investment opportunity:
“So, some of these companies say, ‘we’re going to 
use [your funds] to build this’, for example, they’re go-
ing to build a wind turbine. But what they really mean 
is we’re going to pay off the loans that we borrowed 
to pay to buy the wind turbine or whatever. I think you 
need to know specifically where the money is going 
and then you want to know how you will extract your 
money out of it” (Securities Investor).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, establishing trust in the 
existence and valuation of an underlying asset was 
of greatest concern to Real Estate crowdfunding in-
vestors, who reported checking that an advertised 
property genuinely existed. Whilst loan-to-value ra-
tios were used as a means of assessing risk, they 
told us that such ratios could be misleading if the 
property value used to calculate them was unreli-
able. We were told that one of the principal barriers 
to trusting a Real Estate crowdfunding project was a 
lack of clarity about the valuation methodology, espe-
cially the ‘hidden’ relational networks that connected 
the property valuers, the property developers and the 
crowdfunding platform:
“… [and you worry about] this nefarious valuation […] 
Many of the valuations appear to be done by a sur-
veyor with some sort of related party interest. None of 
that’s declared on the website” (Real Estate investor).
In leveraging wider networks, investors also re-
ported trawling online forums for personal accounts 
of positive and negative experiences of crowdfund-
ing platforms and investments. This included forums 
provided (i.e. managed and monitored) by platforms 
themselves, as well as popular independent forums 
such as the UK’s FrankP2P website12. As Mollick 
(2014) has shown, this culture of online forums pro-
vides the opportunity for investors to share their emo-
tions – i.e. perceptions, feelings, and quality assess-
ments – with respect to a given platform, as well as to 
test claims made publicly by a platform against inves-
tor experiences. This can lead crowdfunding inves-
tors to exhibit those same ‘herding’ trends common 
to other financial markets (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 
2013), but both lesser and more experienced inves-
tors in our sample viewed these forums as providing 
a vital means of social support when trying to calcu-
late who to trust for the best mix of risk and return.
4.2. Expectations: Pursuing Blended Returns
In all six markets, interviewees told us they were 
motivated to invest in crowdfunding by a desire to di-
versify their overall portfolio, to minimise losses else-
where, and to benefit from slightly higher rates of re-
turn relative to high-street banks. Investors reported 
avoiding those platforms that appeared to offer very 
high rates, however, expecting that this was an in-
dication that only borrowers in distress and/or with 
sub-prime projects were operating via that platform. 
Their expectations of what appeared to be the correct 
‘strike’ point of a good rate varied, but was significant 
in adjusting their assessment of risk and, therefore, 
how far to trust an investment:
“I think […] one of the reasons why I’m less attracted 
to the high return loan products on offer is, y’know, 
if you look and they give you 7-8, or 10-12, percent 
[…] I know there must be riskier borrowers involved 
there” (P2C Lender).
P2C Lenders in our sample managed risk by 
spreading investments across multiple mini-invest-
ments (often providing as little as £10 towards a 
target), in order to provide further protection against 
non-repayment by individual borrowers. This ability to 
spread very small investments was one of the most 
common reasons given for ‘feeling safe’ in crowdfund-
ing markets. In terms of our wider argument, the fol-
lowing quote also reveals the importance some inves-
tors attach to the idea of crowdfunding as ‘alternative, 
disruptive, or democratizing’ (Langley and Leyshon 
2017) when compared to more traditional finance.
“I like [platforms] because they split the money into 
lots of tiny little bits, so you get the security of spread-
ing your money across things. I like the idea that 
there’s an alternative for people to go to who want to 
borrow money, rather than from banks or loan sharks. 
And I think that they are quite sensible alternatives 
now. They’re well enough established to be a good 
alternative. If you want to borrow some money to go 
and buy a car or something, [Platform X] and [Plat-
form Y] are sensible places to go look. They come up 
with good prices […] and they also give quite good 
returns compared to banks, so I’m happy to carry on 
[lending]” (P2C Lender).
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Of course, the diversification of very small amounts 
of capital was not always seen as a ‘rational’ ap-
proach. As one more experienced investor causti-
cally remarked: “ there’s no point having a diversi-
fied portfolio if all you have is diversified shit!” (Real 
Estate Investor).
In reflecting on their decision to move money into 
crowdfunding, investors did report a mix of ‘extrin-
sic’ and ‘intrinsic’ motivations (Allison et al. 2015). 
The desire to contribute a more ‘social’ return was 
expressed in two main ways. First, several inves-
tors wanted “after the financial crisis, just to give the 
banks a kicking!” (P2C Lender). Second, investors 
also sought to push back against narrow, financial-
only returns, noting their frustration with crowdfund-
ing platforms providing the same crude assessment 
levels as traditional institutions (i.e. ‘High, Medium, 
Low’ risk). P2B investors and P2C lenders especially 
wanted crowdfunding to facilitate more refined choic-
es that would allow for allocating funding to projects 
or businesses that would realise social and ethical 
outcomes, as well as financial returns. This was re-
layed to us as investments in a social enterprise, a 
local community project, in renewable energy infra-
structure – those areas of ‘systematic underinvest-
ment’ outlined by Block (2014).
“The limited choice that I have is whether to pick 
which associated risk group my money is being lent 
out to […] Obviously, I know certainly with the mon-
ey I’ve got invested that it’s going out in personal 
loans, and obviously there’s an ethical association 
with that. I don’t want to be involved with people 
getting into debt. But yes, I think that they [more 
‘social’/‘ethical’ investment options] would be quite 
a thing!” (P2C Lender).
This mix of motivations helps to explain why peo-
ple are moving their money into crowdfunding, which 
our data shows is based upon far more than seeking 
optimal financial returns. The expectation that crowd-
funding platforms enable investors to have a more 
direct say in precisely where and how much of their 
capital is allocated to a given borrower or social / en-
vironmental project was a major factor, with obvious 
implications for democratizing finance (Block 2014; 
Palladino 2019).
4.3. Experience: Using Automated Invest-
ment Tools
We were surprised, therefore, to learn that many of 
our interviewees were content to surrender this new 
found financial agency in favour of using ‘automated 
investment’ tools provided by the platforms. Com-
mon in high-frequency trading (MacKenzie 2018; 
Preda 2017; Coombs 2016), and with problematic 
consequences (Borch 2016), these tools rely upon 
complex algorithms to allocate capital automatically 
to investment opportunities as per a set rate of inter-
est and default-risk.
Reliance upon automated systems in crowdfunding 
is increasing. CCAF (2016) collected and analysed 
quantitative survey data from European crowdfunding 
markets to show that 82% of P2C lending and 38% 
of P2B investments were arranged by automated 
processes in 2016. This growing preference for au-
tomation appears to undermine the very principle of 
‘peer-to-peer’ (P2P) lending, as it (re)introduces an 
intermediary responsible for allocating capital within 
certain agreed parameters – in this case, an algorithm 
rather than a portfolio manager. If responsibility for in-
vestment decisions is so willingly surrendered, then 
the use of automated tools does seem to undermine 
the positioning of crowdfunding as ‘alternative, dis-
ruptive, or democratic’ (Langley and Leyshon 2017).
Drawing on our data, one explanation for this is 
that relative levels of experience amongst investors 
operating in crowdfunding markets are significant. 
Individual selection was more common in P2B and 
Real Estate markets, where prior experience of in-
vestment was higher, with auto-bidding tools more 
common for P2C lenders, where experience was 
limited. Automation was also preferential for those 
investors without the available time to engage in pro-
tracted and detailed analysis of their investment op-
tions, especially given the small amounts of capital 
they trusted in these markets relative to their overall 
portfolio (Ahlers et al. 2015).
The preference for selecting investments amongst 
P2B investors was typically because they felt their 
expertise could in effect “beat” any automated algo-
rithm and thus yield higher financial returns. Those 
P2B investors in our sample, however, also reported 
enjoying the feeling of supporting small businesses 
and creating jobs, thus realising more social / non-
financial outcomes that they felt were inadequately 
catered for by markets elsewhere. This was true also 
for Equities and Securities Investors, who avoided 
automated tools because they preferred the time-
consuming process of browsing websites and select-
ing opportunities, which was precisely why they were 
participating in crowdfunding. As these markets were 
an additional field of activity, separate from their main 
sources of income, they reported enjoying the pro-
cess of ‘gamble and jeopardy’ in seeing whether the 
business they had selected succeeded or failed.
“I take opportunities where I can analyze it myself 
and I don’t necessarily believe in the [automated] in-
vestments […] But for myself, I rather prefer to set-off 
and be the master of my destiny, and analyze stuff 
myself, and look at stuff myself” (Equities Investor).
The time it takes to realise returns from Equities 
and Securities investments was also a factor in reject-
ing automated tools. These investors were thinking 
for the longer-term in the crowdfunding sector, hop-
ing that their chosen investment “becomes the new 
Facebook” (Equities Investor). Significantly for the 
goal of democratizing finance, they believed that mak-
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ing careful selections in order to provide ‘patient capi-
tal’ for businesses and projects over the longer-term 
(Mazzucato 2018; 2013; Klinger-Vidra 2016) was of 
greater importance than simply investing ‘idle cash’ for 
a quick financial return. Likewise, Real Estate inves-
tors in our sample wanted to dedicate time to selecting 
opportunities in property, depending upon the number 
and size of investments that each was making:
“I enjoy it, so I probably spend somewhere between 
an hour and two hours each day just keeping an eye 
on what’s going on and picking up new loans, moving 
money around” (Real Estate Investor).
As the following quote indicates, a process of ‘ear-
marking’ money – either by platform or by investment 
opportunity – is a significant factor in understanding 
investor behaviour in crowdfunding markets. 
“[Platform B] is for some money that I don’t need to 
think about. I don’t necessarily feel the need to man-
age everything actively. Some of the money that is 
there is in [Platform B’s] rolling short-term account, 
and it’s there because I think I might need it in a 
year’s time. I suspect that I will probably run down 
my five-year lending on [Platform B]. Historically, I’ve 
had a mixture of five-year money and rolling money, 
with the rolling money being stuff that I think I might 
actually need” (P2B Investor).
P2C lenders, however, were split in their use and 
preference for automated investments, perhaps be-
cause these investments were seen as a higher-
yielding substitute for ‘idle cash’ that would otherwise 
be accruing almost zero interest in high-street bank 
accounts. Some P2C lenders reported being attract-
ed to crowdfunding precisely because of the fully au-
tomated processes:
“I only look for an [automated] one […] I hand over 
completely the responsibility to the platform. I mean 
what interested me was that they spread the risk 
across multiple people, and that they had a good 
[contingency] fund” (P2C Lender).
Other P2C lenders disagreed:
“No, I am absolutely not looking for a fully [automat-
ed] service! And I do, absolutely, prefer to do it myself 
[…] I guess there’s a bit of mental accounting where 
I think I should put some of it in a risky box for the 
long-term. And then some of it is in a safe spot, there 
for emergencies. Then at the same time I consider 
myself ‘irrational’, still having an ISA with savings, the 
same thing as cash. It’s not rational, but I still have 
it. So, I’m definitely not rational in this. Yeah, so I do 
a little bit of everything. I try to stay diversified so I 
wouldn’t invest too much into one pot” (P2C Lender).
Engaging with both the rational and emotional ex-
pectations of potential investors is clearly important in 
order to scale (Berezin 2009; Preda 2009; Galak et al. 
2011). Increasing automation may compromise crowd-
funding’s capacity to democratize finance, however, 
instead accelerating wider processes that seek to re-
move human influence over economic decision-making 
in an increasingly decentralized and financialised econ-
omy (Lash and Dragos 2016; Vigna and Casey 2016). 
If investment parameters are automated around narrow 
criteria of only financial risk and return, crowdfunding 
could further entrench – rather than radically rebalance 
– power relations in the global financial system.
4.4. Earmarking: Prepared to Lose
More hopefully, then, it is interesting that interview-
ees across all six markets reported making crowd-
funding investments without any real expectation of 
high financial returns. Investors ensured a safe level of 
financial protection by choosing to operate with funds 
they had earmarked as being ‘prepared to lose’. Often 
these funds were unearned, acquired via a ‘windfall 
event’ such as an inheritance, an unexpected yield 
from traditional investments, or else by recycling the 
interest realised from existing crowdfunding ventures. 
In this sense, the money being used was variously 
interpreted through the prism of “gift, payment, enti-
tlement” established by Zelizer (1994). Consequently, 
investors ‘earmarked’ these funds differently and re-
garded this money as appropriate for more ‘social’ in-
vestments, with crowdfunding seen as the most direct 
and transparent mechanism for achieving this.
Investors were also happy to ‘play around’, testing 
the robust nature of platform processes and prom-
ises, accepting that things were more likely to go 
wrong with ‘alternative’ investments. They reported 
that their limited expectations of high financial returns 
shaped their behaviour in these markets, regarding 
these investments as an opportunity to ‘take a punt’ 
on a particular business, asset, or social / environ-
mental concern. Some investors even preferred to 
allocate funding to particular UK regions for which 
they held a sentimental attachment, raising interest-
ing questions about the potential of crowdfunding to 
facilitate citizen-led and ‘place-based’ financial struc-
tures, such as community municipal investments 
(Davis and Cartwright 2019; Wright 2016).
As an example, some investors admitted that deci-
sions were made in a matter of seconds, driven by 
an urgency to invest ‘idle cash’ they had earmarked 
for that purpose. In a telling quote, one time-pressed 
P2B investor revealed a rapid approach to investing 
based solely upon how a trusted platform assessed 
the ‘quality’ of the borrowers (i.e. into risk categories 
of A, B, and C): 
“Yeah […] I spend quite a while just on some, and 
then other times it varies, and there are times I think 
I have no time to go into this, so, I’ll just, ‘tick, tick, 
tick, tick’ – that will be B or that’s a C. And I found 
actually that sometimes the As were okay, except you 
got lower rates. I think that Bs were worse than the 
Cs. The second one down is the second highest risk 
and that was quite surprising, because you’re getting 
more [return] off the Cs than the Bs. And the Bs de-
faulted more than the Cs!” (P2B Investor).
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Likewise, experienced Equities and Securities in-
vestors spoke of being relatively disinterested in con-
ducting extensive due diligence precisely because 
they were prepared to lose in these markets:
“There’s no guarantees with any of it. So, y’know, 
the little investor may make a good profit; they may 
make a total loss. But the idea is you don’t invest 
your shirt on it. You just put in pocket money really” 
(Equities Investor).
And again:
“It’s a tiny proportion that I invest in crowdfunding eq-
uities, as a proportion of my total portfolio, but I’d like 
to increase it if my confidence in it grows, as I think 
it will. But at the moment, it’s just how much spare 
money that I’ve got” (Securities Investor).
Similarly, most P2B Investors had strict rules about 
the maximum they would invest in any single loan, 
especially if they had previously experienced defaults 
when straying from that principle:
“In the beginning, I put more and more in. And then 
I sort of started to get [the level of investment] back 
down. I think it’s too much exposure, so I’ve reduced 
it now. As I put more in, I took more risk. That was a 
big mistake because I would put £600 [GBP] out to 
one guy and then he’d put it another loan for some-
thing else. And I lent out another £600 [GBP] to him 
again for something else, because he had a good 
story. If it hadn’t been for him, I wouldn’t have lost 
£1,200 [GBP]! So, I’ve been [cheated] a couple of 
times. So, then I felt like I’m not going to lend that 
amount of money again – it’s just going to be, maxi-
mum £20 [GBP]” (P2B Investor)
When prompted during interviews, it was surpris-
ing how few investors in our sample understood the 
‘wind down’ process should a platform collapse. 
Most were simply unconcerned, assuming that their 
legal rights must be strong and trusting that the 
subsequent administration of any platform collapse 
would ensure their investments were protected. 
Others were more worried, citing concerns over how 
much time the process could take and the amount 
of additional fees an administrator might demand for 
this service (a concern that was most acute in Real 
Estate markets). 
Most P2B investors did not consider ‘wind down’ 
a danger, but recognised that there was a remote 
material risk that a platform could fail, which was 
perceived to be separate from the risk of losing 
their investment (hence diversifying their invest-
ments across platforms as well as markets). Both 
P2B Investors and P2C lenders did not fear losing 
a significant amount of their investment this way, at 
least in part because they believed portfolios would 
be either ‘wound down’ by a 3rd party platform or 
acquired by another: 
“My expectation is that, y’know, an ideal outcome 
would be another platform steps in, and so buys 
the book or picks the book up and agrees to man-
age it. I think that’s optimistic. I think a more re-
alistic proposition is that essentially administrators 
would come in. Lawyers would come in and their 
loan book would get wound up over there. Lend-
ers would or should expect to take a ‘haircut’. Now, 
is that haircut 2 percent, 5 percent, 20 percent? I 
don’t know. I have no way of really judging that” 
(P2B Investor).
We interpret these relatively relaxed attitudes to 
‘wind down’ in line with our findings that investors in 
crowdfunding markets are typically using funds they 
have earmarked as being prepared to lose.
5. Conclusions
Radical reform of the global financial system is 
pressing. Greater democratic control over finance 
would begin to disempower a financial elite who ap-
pear increasingly unaccountable to the public. One 
way to democratize finance is to create new financial 
channels that redirect money so as to overcome sys-
tematic underinvestment in those areas of the econ-
omy capable of tackling urgent social and climate 
emergencies. Crowdfunding is one such channel 
that has emerged to offer greater accountability and 
transparency over how and where money is invest-
ed. But, if democratizing finance requires the wider 
public to move their money into crowdfunding, how is 
trust in these platforms and alternative investments 
to be achieved?
This paper has responded to this question, and the 
need for economic sociology to understand better the 
dynamics of how trust in economic relations is built 
and negotiated, by establishing how and why existing 
investors already trust crowdfunding. Analysing the 
data from our project with the UK’s Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), we found that investors: mobilise 
embedded networks to establish trust in crowdfund-
ing; are motivated by expectations of ‘blended re-
turns’; prefer automated investment tools if they lack 
experience; and typically invest with funds they have 
earmarked as being prepared to lose. 
To conclude, we offer three closing remarks as 
a contribution to further research in this area. First, 
the four concepts we used to frame our analysis are 
clearly interrelated. Engagement with crowdfunding 
markets was clearly influenced by pre-existing social 
ties, as more experienced investors were embed-
ded in networks that enabled them to leverage so-
cial and cultural capital to negotiate and build trust 
in crowdfunding. These investors also used money 
earmarked specifically for crowdfunding, which in 
turn shaped their motivations and impacted upon 
their expectations of a more complex blended return 
of social, environmental and economic outcomes. 
Taken together, we suggest that our data adds further 
empirical weight to Zelizer’s (1994) insight that our 
engagement with money and markets is ‘relational’ 
rather than rational.
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Second, we suggest that it is possible to in-
terpret crowdfunding as providing a form of ‘less 
impatient capital’ (Mazzucato 2018; 2013; Klinger-
Vidra 2016). Whilst different to State-led ‘patient 
capital’, the different ‘time horizons’ (Beckert 
2015; Bourdieu 1979) of economic activities in 
these markets mean that investors do not always 
expect high returns in a short timeframe. Instead, 
investors shift their expectations in order to utilise 
crowdfunding as way of rolling ‘idle cash’ or ear-
marking ‘pots’ of windfall money to social and/or 
environmental projects over a longer period. The 
UK sector has already demonstrated crowdfund-
ing’s capacity for facilitating long-term financing 
in areas of ‘systematic underinvestment’ by main-
stream lenders (e.g. clean and renewable energy, 
SMEs, and retrofitting building stock). Thus, as a 
form of democratic finance, crowdfunding can be 
mobilised for public infrastructure projects provid-
ing the outcome is transparently positive in social 
and/or environmental terms.
Third, if crowdfunding is to provide a way of rebal-
ancing the wider financial system, then there needs 
to be a shift in the power dynamics operating inside 
these markets. Currently, those projects receiv-
ing funding – and consequently the type of society 
slowly being created via these investments – reflect 
the specific worldview of a narrow demographic of 
already well-resourced and well-networked individu-
als. Without a greater democratisation of investment 
(Palladino 2019), the outcomes of crowdfunding ac-
tivities will increasingly tend only to reflect the eth-
ics of participating white men, over-55 years of age, 
and retired. Thus, we reiterate that it is vital for future 
research to pursue an analysis of the ‘gendered re-
gime’ of finance (Walby 2015). We therefore agree 
with Langley and Leyshon (2017) that, until partici-
pation diversifies considerably, it is sensible to cau-
tion against any hasty celebration of crowdfunding as 
already being ‘alternative, disruptive, or democratic’. 
If evermore members of the wider public are to be 
encouraged to shift their funds into crowdfunding, in 
pursuit of a democratic finance, then we conclude 
that enhanced investor protection is needed first so 
that the victims of neoliberal financialisation are not 
further exploited.
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Notes
[1] The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the conduct 
regulator for over 58,000 businesses in the UK and the 
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